Towards an Integrated, Liberal Theory of the Canadian State by O’Byrne, Shannon Kathleen
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Towards an Integrated, Liberal Theory of the Canadian State"
 
Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne
Les Cahiers de droit, vol. 33, n° 4, 1992, p. 1057-1092.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/043175ar
DOI: 10.7202/043175ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 02:58
Towards an Integrated, Liberal Theory 
of the Canadian State* 
Shannon Kathleen O ' B Y R N E * * 
In this article, the author challenges the tendency in common law 
Canada to conflate the distinction between State and society. Following 
the analysis of Kenneth Dyson, the author contends that the State occupies 
a distinct sphere produced by or contained in the interconstitutive relation-
ship of State institution, on the one hand, and State idea, on the other. The 
State concept is presented as neither merely active nor merely passive but 
as involving a relationship between action and reflection, between institu-
tion and idea. The author then analyses the broadly shared public values 
which are contained in the Canadian State idea when viewedfrom a liberal 
political perspective. That these values incrementally modulate the exer-
cise of public power—and vice versa—argues for a State-society distinc-
tion which is not generally emphasized in common law Canada. 
L'auteure remet en cause la tendance à assimiler les notions d'État et 
de société qui existe dans les provinces canadiennes de common law. A la 
manière de Kenneth Dyson, elle avance l'idée que l'État occupe une 
sphère distincte, produit de l'interrelation de l'État-institution et du con-
cept d'Etat. Ni simplement actif ou passif, ce concept d'Etat confronte 
action et réflexion, institution et idée. L'auteure analyse ensuite les valeurs 
publiques couramment véhiculées par le concept d'État canadien perçu 
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the Edmonton law firm of Parlée McLaws for providing useful commentary on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
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dans une perspective libérale. Ces valeurs modulent graduellement l'exer-
cice du pouvoir et inversement. Ce phénomène devrait conduire à distin-
guer l'État de la société, ce qui n'est pas aussi courant dans les provinces 
de common law. 
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By following a well-worn Anglo-American strategy, Canada outside 
Quebec has not produced an integrative theory of the State. Alan Cairns, 
for example, while acknowledging a society-State symbiosis1, and pro-
ducing significant insights concerning its impact, nonetheless relies on a 
model which emphasizes conflation. The State — because it cannot exist 
« in splendid isolation from the buffeting world and from its own his-
tory2 » — often simply coextends with the society in which it is found. On 
the « embeddedness » of State and society, Cairns writes : 
The recent literature positing the autonomy of the state is a welcome advance from 
assumptions that the state is no more than a reflecting mirror, or a neutral arena 
where contending social interests struggle ceaselessly for advantage. The state is 
unquestionably actor as well as umpire [...] However, the stress on autonomy can 
lead to an uncritical view of the state as aloof and distant. Realistically, autonomy 
exists only at the margin where the state can play a catalytic role with new 
ventures [...] The state, as a result of past performance, is embedded in society, 
linked in thousands of ways to interests in society that no longer can meaningfully 
be described as private [emphasis added]3. 
1. A. CAIRNS, «The Past and Future of the Canadian Administrative State», (1990) 
40 U. Toronto L.J. 319, 321. 
2. Id., 320. 
3. A. CAIRNS, « The Embedded State : State-Society Relations in Canada », in K. BANTING 
(ed.), State and Society : Canada in Comparative Perspective, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1986, p. 53, pp. 78-79 (foonotes deleted). 
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The perspective of David Cohen is entirely similar. As Daniel Mockle 
points out : 
Cohen revient constamment sur certains thèmes, un peu comme s'il s'agissait de 
leitmotiv. [Une] confusion « state-community » est d'une importance majeure 
dans l'approche suivie par Cohen puisqu'il n'hésite pas à en tirer les ultimes 
conséquences (« the state is everything » ; « we are also regulating bureaucrats »). 
L'État ne bénéficie d'aucune autonomie fonctionnelle et politique. Il n'est plus 
qu'un cadre ou un moyen où s'opposent irréductiblement divers intérêts par-
ticuliers au sein de la communauté4. 
The model invoked by Cohen and Cairns — while clearly providing 
insight into important aspects of the modern Canadian State — also leads to 
disintegration because its constitutive elements are predicated on the 
presence of social fragmentation, political diversity and pluralism. As 
these are the matters which the model selects for discussion, these are also 
the matters which are taken as comprising the State. Indeed, 
The pervasive grip of the society-centred perspective helps explicate the common 
absence of a clear and consistent state-society distinction. It has also resulted in a 
conception of the state as little more than an arena within which societal conflicts 
are fought out, interests mediated, and the ensuing results authoritatively con-
firmed5. 
In short, a disintegrative theory analyzes the Canadian State in a self-
validating way. It only finds diversity because it does not possess mech-
anisms to detect or account for cohesion. 
Even Anglophone experts on constitutional law fail to consider the 
State as a subject for distinct study. The approach of Peter Hogg is rep-
resentative : it is to make do with ajuridical theory of the State6. This means 
regarding the Canadian State independently from the sociological, political 
and intellectual activity which produces it and so to see the State as being 
4. D. MOCKLE, «La Couronne et l'Administration fédérale: mise au point», (1989) 28 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 135, 138 (footnotes deleted). 
5. E.A. NORDLINGER, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1981, p. 5. 
6. Though his text on constitutional law is otherwise exceptional, Hogg chooses to ap-
proach the idea of the State from a doctrinal and instrumental perspective only. This is 
revealed in his definition of constitutional law as « the law prescribing the exercise of 
power by the organs of the State ». See P. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., 
Toronto, Carswell, 1992, p. 1. Beyond endorsing the position, at p. 1, that the constitu-
tion is « a mirror reflecting the national soul », Hogg does not explore the ideas behind 
the rules. This silence is not inadvertent but axiomatic : in Hogg's construction, the State 
is, by and large, no more or less than those things by which it is regulated. The traditional 
strategy is not the exclusive one, however. The University of Toronto, for example, has 
recently produced a special issue on administrative law wherein several of its con-
tributors distance themselves from overly juristic constructions. Nonetheless, these 
scholars remain in the minority. See (1990) 40 U. Toronto L.J. 305 and following. 
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contained in, described by, and coextensive with an organization of legal 
structures. Accordingly, the State is only considered within the context of 
those formalized and definition producing rules, procedures, regulations, 
systems, and orderings which constrain it. While it is generally acknow-
ledged that principles contained in rules qualify the exercise of power so as 
to ensure that the State does not behave in an arbitrary, though technically 
legal fashion7, this acknowledgement is rather more a tacit assumption than 
it is a matter for analysis. There is no exploration of the relationship 
between individual and State, no attempt to identify «the framework of 
values within which public life should be conducted8», no attempt to 
understand the Canadian State as an integrated, multifaceted concept. 
Indeed, and as a result, many Canadian legal scholars tend not to distin-
guish between State and law ; the coextension is so patent, it seems, that 
they perceive no need to acknowledge the distinction even for the purpose 
of dismissing it9. 
But the Canadian State is not simply about rules and the procedurally 
correct exercise of power. Nor is it mainly about a relatively fluid means of 
dispute resolution amongst competing groups. Because both approaches 
are complementary — it is the law which decides whether a dispute has 
been resolved authoritatively or not — both suffer from the same defi-
ciency. That is, both fail to disclose fully that the State is not a « neutral 
executor mechanically implementing societal choices and choosing among 
competing demands by some agreed calculus10 » ; or a « neutral institution 
[which has] arisen out of pure chance or accident11 ». The State must be 
about something more than law or social compromise or a « ragged pat-
tern » of incrementalism12, because government institutions create « prob-
lems of rule [...] not to be understood exhaustively by describing their 
formal structures or the patterns of interaction within them13 ». As Mockle 
notes : 
7. For more on this point, see A. D'ENTRÈVES'S account of the difference between legality 
and legitimacy : The Notion of the State : An Introduction to Political Theory, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1967, pp. 141-149. 
8. K. DVSON, The State Tradition in Western Europe : A Study of an Idea and Institution, 
Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1980, p. 271. 
9. While it is true that a text on constitutional law should devote much of its attention to 
legal constructs, a less juristic approach would also lead to analysis of principles 
informing the rules as well as an evaluation of their conformity to the requirements of 
liberal democratic theory and other measures of political legitimacy. 
10. A. CAIRNS, he. cit., note 3, 58. 
11. A. VINCENT, Theories of the State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, p. 3. 
12. A. CAIRNS, loc. cit., note 1, 321. 
13. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 6. 
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Entre l'État et la communauté, cette différence est éclatante. Différence de buts, 
de moyens, de statut, d'organisation, tout concourt à accentuer l'autonomie de 
l'État même s'il existe depuis fort longtemps une imbrication étroite et complexe 
entre l'État et la société. Par analogie avec la pensée écologique, Fleiner-Gerster 
affirme que loin d'être antagoniques, ces deux éléments sont semblables aux 
éléments naturels d'un biotope en étant complémentaires, interdépendants et 
distincts. D'où la nécessité de maintenir un équilibre14. 
Articulation of a theory of the State based on identifiable public values and 
broadly shared understandings remains an endeavour long outstanding 
amongst certain groups within Canada. While State theory has received 
significant treatment from French-speaking theorists15, American femin-
14. D. MOCKLE, loc. cit., note 4, 141. He also writes, in reference to Cohen and unnamed 
others (p. 140) : « Ces auteurs, la plupart libéraux ou néo-libéraux, auraient dû pourtant 
comprendre que l'État et la société ne forment pas deux domaines objectivement 
distincts, mais représentent en réalité deux formes distinctes de la communauté civile, 
chacune ayant sa nature propre. » 
15. Francophone scholars, in keeping with the European tradition, have produced a vast 
body of literature concerning the State. See the list of works identified by the L A W 
REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA. The Legal Status of the Federal Administration, 
Working Paper No. 40, Ottawa, Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985, pp. 89-100. 
In addition, see : G. BERGERON, Le fonctionnement de l'État, Quebec, PUL, 1965 and 
Petit traité de l'État, coll. « La politique éclatée », Paris, PUF, 1990 ; D. MOCKLE, « La 
réforme du statut juridique de l'Administration fédérale : observations critiques sur les 
causes du blocage actuel », (1986) 29 Adm. Pub. Can. 282, loc. cit., note 4, and « Les 
enjeux et les difficultés d'une conception essentialiste de l'État et de l'Administration en 
droit français », (1990) 24 R.J.T. 291-337 ; G. BUDEAU, L'État, coll. « Points », Paris, 
Seuil, 1970 ; H. LEFEBVRE, De l'État, Paris, Union générale d'éditions, 1976 ; A. PAS-
SERIN D 'ENTRÈVES, La notion d'État, Paris, Sirey, 1969; T. FLEINER-GERSTER, Théorie 
générale de l'État, Paris, PUF, 1986 ; B. BADIE and P. BIRNBAUM, Sociologie de l'État, 
Paris, Grasset et Fasquelle, 1982; J. CHEVALLIER, «L'État de droit», (1988) R.D.P. 
313. Mockle summarizes the European State tradition in the following terms, loc. cit., 
note 4, 141 : 
Il faut simplement noter que tout au long des XIXe et XXe siècles, un courant 
multiforme de la pensée politique, juridique et sociologique a toujours accepté 
ce postulat fondamental de l'autonomie de l'État. Dans la pensée européenne, 
cette idée est si bien assimilée que nombreux sont les auteurs qui ne soupçon-
nent même pas qu'on puisse postuler autre chose, tellement le fait semble 
élémentaire. D'un commun accord, ils se bornent à constater que la société 
globale est faite elle-même de sociétés de tout ordre, au nombre desquelles 
figure principalement l'institution par excellence, soit l'État à titre de société 
institutionnalisée. Tout récemment, on a même tenté de montrer l'existence 
d'une conception organique de l'État dans la pensée européenne, à travers 
l'évolution complexe d'une multitude de courants politiques et philosophiques 
[footnotes deleted]. 
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ists, and scholars writing from a neo-Marxist perspective16, there has been 
no sustained effort in common law Canada to produce a liberal theory of 
the State, no attempt to explore the extent to which the Canadian State 
achieves a separate existence through what liberal democratic theory 
would require of it both ideologically and institutionally. 
But to argue in favour of a cohesive, liberal theory of the State is not to 
be blind to the enormous difficulties associated with producing it. Indeed, 
the notion of the « State » is subject to contestation because it seeks 
agreement on fundamental antecedents such as matters of method and 
questions of epistemology ; it seeks agreement on the nature of power and 
its exercise ; it seeks agreement on the essence of humankind17 and on the 
quality of public authority. Further, even with a level of agreement on these 
matters, the nature of a given State must be interpreted within the context 
of the ideological tradition with which it combines18. In sum, the whole 
project is subject to derailment at any point because the State « involves 
problems of meaning and application19 ». For this reason, discussion of the 
16. For a neo-Marxist critique, see, for example, L. PANITCH (ed.), The Canadian State : 
Political Economy and Political Power, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1977. For 
a powerful feminist account of the State, for example, C. MACKINNON, Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 161-162 : 
« The state is male in the feminist sense : the law sees and treats women the way men see 
and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social 
order in the interest of men as a gender [footnotes deleted] ». See too, C. Weisbrod, 
« Practical Polyphony : Theories of the State and Feminist Jurisprudence », (1990) 24 
Georgia L. Rev. 985. 
17. C.B. MACPHERSON, « Do We Need a Theory of the State », Archives européennes de 
sociologie, vol. 18, 1977, p. 224, writes: «The hallmark of the grand theories [of the 
State] is that they all tied the state back to supposed essentially human purposes and 
capacities, to a supposed essential nature of man. »A. VINCENT, op. c;7.,note II, p. 43, 
remarks that while there is no single conclusion to be derived from one's view of human 
nature, nonetheless, the political theorist «will want to tie in the account of human 
beings with the structure of political arrangements ». G. DUNCAN , « Political Theory and 
Human Nature », in I. FORBES and S. SMITH (eds.), Politics and Human Nature, 
London, Francis Pinter, 1983, as quoted in A. VINCENT, op. cit., note 11, p. 43, asserts 
that «at the centre of political theory lies the effort to establish a relationship between 
human nature, however that is conceived, and the State ». 
18. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 255, attributes part of the elusive quality of the State as 
resulting from the numerous ideological manifestations it is capable of assuming. Speak-
ing more theoretically, R. ALFORD and R. FRIEDLAND, Powers of Theory : Capitalism, 
the State, and Democracy. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 3, remark 
that because the State can be regarded from the perspective of the individual, from the 
perspective of organizations, from the perspective of society — as well as interperspec-
tively— the meaning of «State » is contingent. 
19. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 252. 
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concept of the State imports an intellectual vulnerability openly acknowl-
edged by scholars in the field20. 
And this paper, of course, can only offer itself as a proverbial drop in 
the dialogical bucket. My object is to establish the existence of an auton-
omous State based on sources available in the English language, leaving an 
assessment of the French and German literature to another day. The first 
section of this paper seeks to provide a framework within which an integra-
tive theory of the Canadian State might be constructed. The second section 
attempts to account for the absence of State theory in common law Canada. 
The third section takes the initial step of assessing State theory in the 
context of liberal political dictates. I will argue that locating liberal political 
theory within the State construct in turn generates recognition of a fluc-
tuating set of public values which mandatorily constrain executive, legis-
lative and judicial conduct21 : this is what provides symmetry to individual-
State relations. In accord with the European tradition, and addressing the 
matter from a liberal perspective, I will contend that the State has an 
existence beyond the arena of compromise and law22. 
20. For example, K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. VII, remarks that his book, The State 
Tradition in Western Europe, was not easy to write: «Indeed, colleagues have fre-
quently revealed by their facial expressions (rather than by unkind words of dis-
couragement) a feeling that I was embarking on a hazardous enterprise. » A. D'EN-
TRÈVES,op. cit., note 7, p. 148, makes a similar point : « The search for a legitimate basis 
of power is not an empty and senseless search [...] A theory of the state which takes no 
account of it is necessarily incomplete. It is no use protesting that such notions as 
legitimacy or authority are emotionally loaded, that they are at bottom irrational and 
certainly incapable of definition with the precision and severity of scientific language. 
This emotional and irrational character has never been denied by those few thinkers who 
have been inclined to investigate the idea of legitimacy, and to take it more seriously than 
a mere ideology, a political formula, or a noble lie. » Even the merely institutional State 
cannot be definitionally isolated. See A. CAIRNS, comment, op. cit., note 1, p. 322: 
«The attempt to pin down the contemporary administrative state is doomed to failure. 
Its very boundaries become unclear as the state increasingly involves numerous private 
actors in its pursuit of goals by joint ventures, contract compliance in the service of 
disadvantaged minorities, and extensive and discretionary funding of many of the 
pressure groups. » 
21. For example, I have argued elsewhere that liberal democratic theory mandatorily 
constrains the permissible conduct of the State in the marketplace. I thus question the 
validity of construing government liability through the traditionally invoked private law 
model. See S. O'BYRNE, «Public Power and Private Obligation: An Analysis of the 
Government Contract», (1992) 14 Dathousie L.J. 485. For similar reasons, I have 
contended that common law Canada requires a disciplined approach to public law 
matters as manifest, for example, in le droit administratif. See S. O'BYRNE, «Gener-
ating Public Law», (1992) 5 C.J.A.L.P. 133. 
22. Note that Dyson would regard Canada as a whole as following a « stateless » tradition. 
See my discussion of this point, infra, section 2. 
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In seeking to locate the autonomy of the Canadian State, I do not act as 
its panegyrist. I acknowledge the vast array of critical scholarship which 
identifies the human pain produced by the operation of liberal democratic 
theory, the Rule of Law, and the power structures represented therein. But 
nor am I prepared to trash the Canadian State. I contend that by locating 
the State concept, in unpacking its separate constituents, one finds embod-
iments of important human values as well as «problems of rule ». 
1. Locating the State 
In The State Tradition in Western Europe : A Study of an Idea and 
Institution, Kenneth Dyson describes the approach of Western continental 
Europe to the State. In this tradition, the State is produced by or contained 
in the interconstitutive relationship of State institution, on the one hand, 
and State idea, on the other. Dyson distinguishes between the institution 
and idea which comprise the State notion as follows : 
The notion of the state is neither a passive reflection, nor a determinant, of 
political conduct. Being in part constitutive of political activity and of the [institu-
tion of the] state itself, the idea of the state is connected in an intimate, complex 
and internal way with that conduct, shaped by and shaping it, manipulated by and 
imprisoning the political actor whose political world is defined in its terms23. 
This is a complex representation. The notion of the State is presented as 
neither merely active nor merely passive but as involving a relationship 
between action and reflection, between institution and idea : one's theory 
of the State thus becomes a form of social practice and vice versa24. 
Dyson's position is that « ideas do reflect political activity » but not merely 
as « expedients or reflexes of political practice »25. This is because people 
« are as much prisoners as manipulators of the ideas by which they seek to 
explain and legitimate their actions26». Accordingly, to understand the 
State, one must accept that it is more than governmental apparatus and 
political decision-making : it is « partly constituted by the beliefs that 
people hold about it27 ». In sum, the State idea is recognized as a force 
which consciously modulates, forms, and combines with the institutional 
State in its every incarnation : theory is not only system, it is also par-
ticipant. 
23. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, pp. 2-3. 
24. Dyson's strategy here has much in common with Terry Eagleton's assertion that «just as 
all social life is theoretical so all theory is real social practice ». See : T. EAGLETON, The 
Significance of Theory and Other Essays, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 24. 
25. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 2. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Id., p. 3. 
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Approaching the State from a Western continental European perspec-
tive means accepting that the State is not understood only by isolating 
bureaucratic and political behaviour, or discussing the power struggles 
born of federalism, or analyzing Canadian statutory law. Adopting a 
Western continental European strategy means acknowledging the value in 
exploring pre-existing perspectives on what the State is ; it means taking 
the position that standards influence official behaviour and vice versa. It 
necessarily requires locating the State notion beyond idea, beyond institu-
tion and in the space between those two constituents28. 
Dyson's account of the State is far removed from the traditional, 
doctrinal analysis of the institutional State as it is often understood. To 
recognize an imbricated notion of the State, to venture beyond the State's 
obvious physical and legal connotation and consider it as a « « lived » 
historical and socio-cultural phenomenon29 » is not a common strategy 
amongst English-speaking legal theorists30. This absence, I will argue in the 
next section, must be considered a deficiency because the notion of the 
State clearly exists and is contained, partially at least, in the conduct of 
bureaucrats and politicians ; in the reasons for which they choose to so 
conduct themselves ; in the liberal democratically imbued measure or 
standard against which that conduct is evaluated ; and, in the unities and 
28. The conceptual complexity in arguing that the State exists in the space between idea and 
institution can perhaps be alleviated by averting to a literary example. The Anglo-Irish 
poet, William Butler Yeats, wrote several ballads which were unconventional for 
employing antithetical structures. Yeats's strategy was to facilitate a collision between 
ballad stanza and refrain instead of the more traditionally expected unity. As a result, 
poetic meaning is not present within the words of stanza and refrain, nor in the ballad 
structure itself. Rather, it is necessarily located outside the confines of both. Put another 
way, the antithetical relationship (both in structure and theme) between ballad and 
refrain in turn generates, relocates, and transforms poetic meaning. While it is impos-
sible to develop this analysis in a footnote, the reader is referred to W.B. YEATS, « The 
Ghost of Roger Casement », in P. ALTT and R. ALSPACH (eds.), The Variorum Edition of 
the Poems of W.B. Yeats, London, Macmillan, 1966, p. 583. In this ballad, John 
Bull — symbol of British colonial rule in Ireland — is ultimately seen by the poem's 
speaker to have misused and devalued language, history, and folk wisdom. This misuse 
— present in every stanza — is incrementally revealed through the unvaried refrain: 
« The ghost of Roger Casement/is beating on the door ». By invoking this image of a well 
known, murdered Irish rebel, the refrain directs the poem's movement from uncer-
tainty, to knowledge, to an unspoken acceptance by the poem's speaker of Casement's 
call to defy British rule. Like the concept of the State described by Dyson, the meaning 
of Yeats's ballad is located outside of the constituents of form and substance, action and 
reflection, thought and expression. Meaning — both for Yeats and Dyson — is con-
sciously presented as the dynamic product of constitutive interaction. 
29. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 4. 
30. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 4, quoting J.P. NETTL, «The State as a Conceptual 
Variable », (1968) World Politics 559, as cited by Dyson. 
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tensions generated by these constitutive elements. If this argument can be 
made successfully, it means that Canada participates, albeit with greater 
attenuation, in a kind of State concept normally only associated with 
Western continental European countries, a concept which involves : 
a body of values, powers, procedures and offices ; [it] represents a concern for 
logic and order in collective arrangements. Its emphasis is upon the autonomous 
exercise of public authority under law [...] upon the unity of such authority, a 
monism that suggests the distinctive character of public affairs ; upon technical 
criteria and professionalism of bureaucratic mores rather than group conflict and 
adjustment ; and upon an essentially moral, substantive concept of the public 
interest that is not viewed as simply emerging from a pluralist process in which 
groups openly compete31. 
2. The Absence of Theory 
It is the case that the concept of the State has been regarded sus-
piciously by numerous Anglo-American theorists. Indeed, their «aca-
demic climate has been generally unreceptive to any general discussion on 
the nature of the State32 ». Even in continental Europe, where the concept 
of the State has genuine cultural resonance, the matter has only recently 
regained its former significance as a component in political and social 
theory33. I now propose to explore the Anglo-American disregard for the 
State concept which — given historical and geographical proximities34— 
provides reasons for the absence of theory in common law Canada as 
well. My account of the Anglo-American perspective will be partial by 
necessity ; a full discussion would require a prolonged interpretation of 
philosophical, social, historical and political directions which influenced 
scholars both to generate and follow certain theoretical paths. Further, an 
explanation for the absence of theory is not pivotal to the integrity of the 
31. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 270. 
32. A. VINCENT, op. cit., note 11, p. 1. See also K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 4. One 
important exception, as Mockle points out, is H. LASKI, The Stale in Theory and 
Practice, New York, The Viking Press, 1935. SeeD. MOCKLE, he. cit., note 4, 140. The 
treatment of State theory by those writing from a Marxist and feminist perspective is 
acknowledged in supra, note 16. 
33. J. KEANE (ed.). Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, London, 
Verso, 1988, p. 1. 
34. P. ROMNEY, « From Constitutionalism to Legalism : Trial by Jury, Responsible Govern-
ment, and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Political Culture », (1989) 7 Law &Hist. Rev. 
121, explores certain of the political, economic and cultural influences which Great 
Britain and the United States have had on Canada. He notes, among other matters, that 
Canada's political culture is the complex product of the «North Atlantic Triangle», 
which references Canada's relationship to the United States and Great Britain. See his 
discussion, loc. cit.. 122, of J .B. BREBNER, The North Atlantic Triangle : The Interplay 
of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, New Haven, Columbia University 
Press, 1945. 
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limited State theory which I will offer later in this paper—the mere 
absence of a theory cannot, without more, prove that a subsequently gen-
erated one lacks viability. The following comments are simply intended, 
therefore, to place into context my own project and to suggest that any 
reflexive tendencies to dismiss the concept of the State are the result of 
contingencies unrelated to the integrity of the concept itself. 
A primary cause for neglect of the State concept in the Anglo-Amer-
ican tradition lies in the real and perceived conflict between the idea of the 
State and the informing principles of democratic liberalism. That the power 
of the merely institutional State cannot be fully reconciled with the liberal 
based sovereignty of each citizen is problematic enough35 — when the idea 
of the State is superimposed onto the institutional one, the assailability of 
the individual and the spectre of totalitarianism appear heightened. Indeed, 
the idea of the State has been linked to problems profoundly antagonistic to 
liberal democratic constructs, including : dictatorial elites36 ; a reduced 
competitive function in political parties and the legislative branch of the 
State37 ; intolerance of dissent and a refusal to accommodate special inter-
ests38 ; the growth of an overly bureaucratized, formalized and hierarchial 
administration39 ; depoUticisation resulting from constraints placed both on 
governmental rule and politicking presumed to emanate from that idea40 ; 
and the growth of intellectual despotism41 the force of which is premised on 
a dictatorial interpretation and imposition regarding the content of that 
idea42. 
Related to the anti-statism of liberalism is the commonly evoked 
strategy of Anglo-American political philosophy to pay « considerable 
attention to particular concepts like democracy, equality, liberty, and 
35. Q. SKINNER, «The State», in T. BALL and J. FARR (eds.), Political Innovation and 
Conceptual Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 122. 
36. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 257. 
37. Id., p. 259. 
38. Id., p. 260. 
39. Id., p. 263. 
40. Id., p. 265. 
41. Id., pp. 268-269. 
42. The irony of this fear is commented on by Mockle who writes, he. cit., note 4, 140 : 
« Malgré certaines exceptions notoires comme l'œuvre de H.J. Laski, ces difficultés ou 
ces réticences à développer une approche conceptuelle fondée sur l'autonomie de l'État 
mènent directement aux pires aberrations. Cohen devrait pourtant savoir que cette 
volonté d'assimiler l'État à la communauté a été l'argument privilégié de plusieurs 
régimes totalitaires où la communauté organique des citoyens et de l'État ne formaient 
plus qu'un. (C'est la solution unitaire de type fasciste.) Le pire, c'est principalement par 
crainte d'un envahissement incontrôlé de l'État au sein de la société civile que tout un 
courant, et non des moindres, a nié l'existence de l'État au profit de la communauté 
[footnotes deleted]. » 
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social justice but not to an overarching concept of rule like state with 
reference to which these might be related43 ». The search for the cohesive 
element implied in the concept of the State is seen as either foolishly 
metaphysical — particularly in light of the growth of twentieth-century, 
Anglo-American empiricism and nominalism44—or foolishly diversion-
ary because the exercise detracts attention from actual political or gov-
ernmental conduct, a more common subject matter of Anglo-American 
analysis45. Further, the centre stage of liberal theorizing remains largely 
occupied by the rational, self-maximizing individual who axiomatically 
constitutes the starting point of any analysis and whose interests are 
considered paramount over collective ones46. 
In sum, the State idea has a contradictory, troubling quality in the 
context of traditional democratic liberal theory and method which even 
now militates against a complete understanding of what political conse-
quences flow from accepting it. All of this leads Anglo-American jurispru-
dence away from acknowledging a fuller concept of the State. Additional 
reasons contributing to the absence of a national theory of the State relate 
to common law Canada's inheritance of certain confusingjuristic traditions 
from Britain, the pluralist quality of Canadian society, and to the fact of 
Canadian federalism. As surveys by F.W. Maitland, Dyson, Skinner, and 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada show47, the British notion of State 
43. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 201. See a similar assessment by A. VINCENT, op. cit., 
note 11, pp. 1-2. 
44. A. VINCENT, op. cit., note 11, p. 2; K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, pp. 199-200; A. D ' E N -
TRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, pp. 62-64. See also K. VON BEYME'S discussion : « The Role of 
the State and the Growth of Government », International Political Science Review, 
vol. 6, 1985, p. 12. 
45. A. D 'ENTRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, p. 62; K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 197. 
46. See J. GRAY, Concepts in Social Thought: Liberalism, Minneapolis, University of 
Minneapolis, 1986, p. 56, wherein he references the rational, self-maximizing, posses-
sive individual model in J. BUCHANAN, Freedom in Constitutional Contract, College 
Station, Texas, Texas A & M University Press, 1977, and D. GAUTIER, Morals by 
Agreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985. See K. DYSON'S general discus-
sion, op. cit., note 8, p. 254 and also at pages 198-199, where he discusses the presence of 
this model in the work of modern liberal theorists such as Robert Nozick and John 
Rawls. 
47. F.W. MAITLAND, «The Crown as Corporation »,(1901) M Law Q. Rev. 131 ; K . D Y S O N , 
op. cit., note 8, pp. 36-37, 210-211 ; Q. SKINNER, loc. cit., note 35 : T H E L A W REFORM 
COMMISSION OF CANADA, op. cit., note 15, pp. 6-12. For comments on the confusion, 
unrealities and fictions associated with the British constitutional Monarch, see A.V. 
DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., London, 
MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1965, pp. 7-12 (1st ed. ; 1885). In his introduction, the editor of 
the 10,h edition states : « the text remains in the form in which it appeared in the seventh 
edition published in 1908. This was the edition in which the Author finally settled the 
text. » 
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and Crown lacks a coherence which Canada—being a former British 
colony and still a titular monarchy — has largely inherited. First, to arrive 
at a modern concept of the State whereby power is understood as imper-
sonal, that is, where an office of the State is seen as having an existence 
separate from and above the individual office-holder, itself involved a long 
historical journey48 and is summarized by Skinner in the following terms : 
the idea that the supreme authority within a body politic should be identified as the 
authority of the state was originally the outcome of one particular theory of 
politics, a theory at once absolutist and secular-minded in its ideological alle-
giances. That theory was in turn the product of the earliest major counter-
revolutionary movement within modern European history, the movement of 
reaction against the ideologies of popular sovereignty developed in the course of 
the French religious wars, and, subsequently, in the English Revolution of the 
seventeenth century. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to find that both the 
ideology of state power and the new terminology employed to express it provoked 
a series of doubts and criticisms that have never been altogether stilled49. 
Some of the more significant doubts are illustrated in an analysis by 
F.W. Maitland showing the imperfect fusion which incorporation effected 
between State and Crown. Mincing no words, Maitland relies on quota-
tions from old English case law and texts to bolster his characterization of 
the Crown corporate concept as an abortive and mischievous trick : 
In the first place, the theory is never logically formulated even by those who are its 
inventors. We are taught that the king is two «persons », only to be taught that 
though he has « two bodies » and « two capacities » he « hath but one person ». 
Any real and consistent severance of the two personalities would naturally have 
led to «the damnable and damned opinion », productive of «execrable and de-
testable consequences », that allegiance is due to the corporation sole and not to 
the mortal man. In the second place, we are plunged into talk about kings who do 
not die, who are never under age, who are ubiquitous, who do no wrong and (says 
Blackstone) think no wrong ; and such talk has not been innocuous [...] But in the 
third place, the theory of the two kings or two persons stubbornly refuses to do any 
real work in the cause of jurisprudence [footnotes deleted]50. 
48. K. DYSON, op, cit., note 8, p. 42. 
49. Q. SKINNER, loc. cit., note 35, 121-122. 
50. F.W. MAITLAND, loc. cit., note 47, 135. For Maitland (p. 133), the modern British State 
emerged with Henry VIII's description of the English body politic. I quote from Henry's 
declaration because it encapsulates one thread in the perplexing history of the British 
State. Henry VIII is reported to have said: « Where by divers sundry old authentick 
histories and chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this realm of 
England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by One supreme 
Head and King, having the dignity and royal estate of the Imperial Crown of the same, 
unto whom a Body Politick, compact of all sorts and degrees of people and by names of 
Spirituality and Temporalty been bounden, and owen to bear, next to God, a natural and 
humble obedience [footnotes deleted]. » 
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The relationship between the undeniable confusion Maitland identifies 
and the fact that common law Canada has not pursued a theory of the State 
is, of course, impossible to establish. We do know that the «Crown» 
functions as symbol of the State in the British tradition but that it cannot do 
the job. We know it cannot do the job because the idea is perplexing, 
conveys no notion of nationhood and does not in any way « systematize the 
relationship of the individual to the state51 ». It may therefore be an idea 
which sustains only refractory analysis and so derails the formulation of a 
coherent State idea. This in turn, may account for the absence of theory. 
Second, and as referred to above, common law Canada has inherited 
the Diceyan-inspired tendency to de-emphasize the separation between 
public and private law — particularly when contrasted to the Roman law 
influence in continental Europe through which the distinction becomes 
pivotal52. Much of the Rule of Law—which includes the idea that every 
person, of whatever rank or condition « is subject to the ordinary law of 
the realm53 » — must go to discounting the Western continental European 
argument of subjecting government to a separate legal regime and holding it 
accountable to a separate court or tribunal. Dicey's text on British con-
stitutional law dismisses the French administrative approach, for example, 
as resting on « ideas foreign to the fundamental assumptions of our English 
common law, and especially to what we have termed the rule of law54». 
The French droit administratif therefore « illustrates, by way of contrast, 
the full meaning ofthat absolute supremacy of the ordinary law of the land 
[...] which we have found to be a salient feature of English institutions55 ». 
It should be noted that any attempt to dismiss out of hand the distinc-
tion between private and public law in Canada and Britain is at bottom 
fictional, given that, for centuries the British government has had a collec-
tion of special powers and immunities derived from its Crown status : it is 
not subject only to ordinary law56. Yet the Diceyan perspective still holds 
51. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 40. 
52. A. V I N C E N T , op. cit., note 11, p. 11. See too T H E L A W REFORM COMMISSION OF 
C A N A D A , op. cit., note 15, p. 27. 
53. A.V. DICEY, op. cit., note 47, p. 193. 
54. Id., p. 329. 
55. Id., p. 330. 
56. See P. H O G G , Liability of the Crown, 2nd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1989, for a discussion 
of these powers and immunities and his criticism of Dicey for failing to deal with them 
properly (p. 3). A.V. DICEY, op. cit., note 47, does acknowledge some points of contact 
between French droit administratif and the British common law (pp. 373-405) and in: 
«The Development of Administrative Law in England », (1915)31 Law Q. Rev. 148, he 
acknowledges even more. Note too Dyson's comment, op. cit., note 8, p. 234, that in 
Britain «a characteristically medieval confusion of public and private responsibility 
remains ». The common law system is caught up in a «web of medieval government 
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remarkably persistent theoretical sway notwithstanding its fictional quality 
and despite the fact that Canadian law—in both its civil and common law 
traditions — does recognize the public-private distinction. 
For example, at the end of the day, it is Dicey upon whom Hogg and 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission indirectly rely when they advocate 
that government be regulated, for the most part, through private law 
principles57. There is a characteristically Anglo-Canadian reluctance either 
to accept the public-private distinction or to acknowledge that the differen-
ces between the individual and the State should generate legal consequen-
ces. My object at this point is not to debate the logic of Hogg's conclusion, 
nor to assess the ideological, epistemological or descriptive critiques of the 
public-private distinction. It is only to argue that denying the significant 
differences between public and private perpetuates the continued ascrip-
tion of a weak status to the Canadian State. Put another way, if we accept 
that public and private are very much the same, then the State cannot be 
about anything very distinct either. And so, again, the relative lack of 
theory about it. 
Another account of why Canada has no theory of the State can be 
related to its composition. On federalism, Vincent makes the classic obser-
vation that it « encourages centrifugal forces, distinct legal structures and a 
general mistrust of centralism58 ». Cairns is more specific, referring to : 
the more than 260 cabinet ministers and their departments of its 11 senior govern-
ments, and in a proliferation of government agencies and corporations only 
loosely connected to the traditional responsible government focus of executive 
authority. Countless programs, mostly old, occasionally new, and frequently 
contradictory are applied by the thousands of separate bureaucratic units of the 
eleven governments. The result is a fragmented state with a fragmenting impact on 
society. Social actors are pulled in multiple directions by the scattering of state 
structures and policies59. 
immunities and concepts which have not permitted the evolution of a coherent body of 
public law». Notwithstanding, the L A W REFORM COMMISSION OF C A N A D A , op. cit., 
note 15, p. 27, remarks that governmental powers and immunities in Canada actually 
« represent the beginnings of a separate body of administrative law applicable to a large 
part of the Administration ». 
57. See P. HOGG, op. cit., note 56, p. 3, and T H E ONTARIO L A W REFORM COMMISSION, 
Report on the Liability of the Crown, Toronto, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1989, 
pp. 2-3. Note that Hogg had conduct of the aforementioned report from its inception 
(p. XIII). 
58. A. VINCENT, op. cit., note 11, p. 11. It should be noted that D. SMILEY and R. W A T T S , 
Intrastate Federalism in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 1-4, 
are careful to criticize equally conceptions of federalism which either over or under-
emphasize the effect of constitutional power divisions. 
59. A. CAIRNS, loc. cit., note 3, 56. 
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The fragmenting effect of federalism, when combined with significant post-
war growth in the Canadian public sector60, a widely dispersed public 
authority61, and a pluralistic society the constitutionally enshrined mul-
ticultural quality of which manifests « the multiple politicized cleavages of 
modernity62 », results in a characterization of the Canadian State as « multi-
ple, scattered and diffuse63 ». This reality leads scholars away from seeking 
to understand the Canadian State as integrative and so, in turn, accounts 
for the relative absence of theory. 
All the foregoing is offered only by way of background, not as apology 
or special pleading. Indeed, whatever one's objective, the concept of the 
State is ultimately not about consensus as it cannot be64, nor is it deter-
mined by what the academic climate would have or not have us do. 
Accordingly, I propose simply to enter the debate and turn to a discussion 
of central components contained in the idea of the Canadian State. By 
uncovering these components, I hope to show—indirectly at least — that 
the public-private distinction is a defensible one, that there is a difference 
between public and private power, and that, from a liberal perspective, it is 
60. Ibid. K. BANTING, « Images of the Modern State », in K. Banting (ed.), op. cit., note 3, 
p. 2, remarks that the most usual measure for growth in the Canadian public sector is 
public expenditure as a proportion of the gross domestic product : « by this standard 
government spending in Canada has risen dramatically from 15.7 percent of our econ-
omic product in 1926 to 47.9 percent in 1983 ». Banting refers the reader to STATISTICS 
C A N A D A , Historical Data Compendium, prepared for the Royal Commission on the 
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 
1985, Table 5.12. See also A. CAIRNS'S comment, he. cit., note 1,325, in reference to the 
same Royal Commission report, that federal and provincial Crown corporations to-
gether actually may produce about 10 percent of the gross national product. 
61. As A. CAIRNS, loc. cit., note 1, 348-349, comments: « The contemporary Canadian state 
is not a unitary actor, but rather a fragmented, sprawling colossus. It manifests itself 
through the central government and the governments of ten provinces and two ter-
ritories [...] Each government is internally fragmented. At the elementary level of the 
number of cabinet ministers with separate portfolios, the combined cabinets of the nine 
provinces and the national government contained only 118 ministers in 1945; four 
decades later, with Newfoundland now a province, the combined figure was 269. » 
62. A. CAIRNS, loc. cit., note 3, 56. 
63. Ibid. CAIRNS also points out (p. 62) that even government attempts to « shape a concep-
tion of community » have become politicized ; this is clearly illustrated, he suggests, in 
the ongoing contest between the federal government and the government of Quebec for 
francophone allegiance. 
64. While a concept of the State seeks agreement over a diverse range of subjects, no such 
agreement is achievable. As K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, pp. 254-255, comments: «the 
state tradition is replete with internal disputes which can be traced back to its ideological 
ambiguity, its openness to reformulation and reinterpretation ». See also R. ALFORD and 
R. F R I E D L A N D , op. cit., note 18, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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a distinction which makes rational governance possible65. Though the 
bifurcation has been subject to considerable criticism which I acknowledge 
elsewhere66, the retrievability of the distinction is demonstrated to the 
extent that the State and society inhabit relatively distinct spheres. 
3. The State Idea 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the idea of the Canadian State from a liberal 
perspective, I propose first to analyze the Rule of Law, realizing, of course, 
that, like the idea of the State, it is a heavily « contested concept67 ». I will 
then seek to identify some of the liberal democratic values which affirm the 
dignity of the individual and which define the public interest. It is my 
position that at least these elements constrain State conduct and render it 
subject to normative scrutiny. Put another way, the Canadian Rule of Law 
and certain other liberal democratic constructs provide the fixed and 
inherited standards upon which the State is constructed and against which 
its conduct is measured. These are the factors which allow us to speak 
about the State as an entity distinct from the pluralizing factors of society 
alone. 
3.2 The Rule of Law 
The Rule of Law receives one of its earliest and most famous defini-
tions by A.V. Dicey, who describes it as comprising three related con-
cepts : first, no person « is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in 
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary 
legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land68 ». Second, no person 
65. See J. BLUM'S discussion of rational governance : « Critical Legal Studies and the Rule 
of Law », (1990) 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 59, 76-77. 
66. In S. O'BYRNE, loc. cit., note 21, 140-145, I acknowledge the epistemological and 
ideological critique of the public-private distinction as well as criticism that the distinc-
tion has no sustainable, descriptive foundation. It is incontestable, as Allan Hutchinson 
asserts, that one ought to acknowledge « similarities between the exercise of govern-
ment and private power and their shared potential for abuse ». See A. HUTCHINSON, 
«Mice under a Chair: Democracy, Courts, and the Administrative State », (1990) 40 
U. Toronto L.J. 374, 377. In my view, Hutchinson's contention does not require 
elimination of the public-private distinction but a reconsideration of the line which is 
traditionally drawn between the two spheres. We can then still acknowledge the sig-
nificant qualitative differences between the exercise of public power through govern-
ment— or its contextual equivalent — and the private power to, for example, enter into a 
consumer contract or quit a job. 
67. See M.J. RADIN, « Reconsidering the Rule of Law», (1989) 69B.U.L.Rev. 781-819,791. 
68. A.V. DICEY, op. cit., note 47, p. 188. 
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is « above the law, but (what is a different thing) [absolutely everyone] is 
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of 
ordinary tribunals69 ». Third, « the general principles of the constitution (as 
for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are 
with us the result of judicial decisions70 ». It is the second arm of Dicey's 
formulation that most concerns us here. 
Since Dicey's late nineteenth-century definition, the Rule of Law 
concept has been subject to analysis by numerous theorists including, and 
without seeking to enumerate them, Sir Ivor Jennings71, and Sir William 
Holdsworth72, it assumes a libertarian incarnation in the work of F.A. 
Hayek73 and, for Bernard Schwartz in Law and the Executive in Britain14, a 
normative and descriptive one. The Rule of Law appears as the exclusive 
object of study at a Chicago Colloquium in 195775 and a Warsaw Con-
ference the following year76. It is regarded supra-nationally by Norman 
Marsh77, tied to legal efficiency by Lon Fuller78, posited as being integral to 
the idea of justice by John Rawls79, scrutinized from a Marxist perspec-
tive by British historian E.P. Thompson80, contained by Joseph Raz81, 
« trashed » by the Critical Legal Studies Movement82, retrieved by reform 
69. id., p. 193. 
70. Id., p. 195. 
71. I. J E N N I N G S , The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., London, University of London 
Press, 1959 (1st ed . : 1943). 
72. W. H O L D S W O R T H , Some Lessons from Our Legal History, New York, Macmillan, 1928. 
73. F.A. H A Y E K , The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
74. B. S C H W A R T Z , Law and the Executive in Britain : A Comparative Study, New York, 
New York University Press, 1949. 
75. See N. MARSH'S discussion of this Colloquium : «The Rule of Law as a Supra-National 
Concept», in A.G. G U E S T (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1961, pp. 223, 230. 
76. See N. MARSH, he. cit., note 75, 235. 
77. Ibid. 
78. L. F U L L E R , The Morality of Law, rev. ed., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969, 
pp. 33-94. 
79. J. R A W L S , A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1971, pp. 235-243. 
80. E.P. THOMPSON, Whigs and Hunters : The Origin ofthe Black Act, London, Allen Lane, 
1975. 
81. J. R A Z , «The Rule of Law and Its Virtue », in J. R A Z , The Authority ofLaw : Essays on 
Law and Morality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 210. 
82. See, for example, A. HUTCHINSON and P. MONAHAN, «Democracy and the Rule of 
Law »,in A. HUTCHINSON and P. MONAHAN (eds.), The Rule of Law : Ideal or Ideology, 
Toronto, Carswell, 1987, pp. 97-124. See also M. H O R W I T Z , «The Rule of Law: An 
Unqualified Human Good » ?, (1977) 86 Yale L.J. 561. Further, see the C.L.S. articles on 
the Rule of Law cited by A. ALTMAN, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 57, and following as well as Altman's 
defense of the Rule of Law against its C.L.S. detractors. 
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orientated liberals such as Jeffrey Blum and reconsidered by Margaret 
Jane Radin within the context of Wittengensteinian philosophy84. But 
notwithstanding the diversity of treatment it has received, however, there 
has been some measure of agreement with respect to its modern formula-
tion as being the rule « of laws, not men85 ». 
Whether the foregoing phrase best contemplates a formalist or sub-
stantive model, however, has not produced the same consensus. Formal-
ists — also known as instrumentalists — regard the Rule of Law as going to 
institutions and procedures86 constraining the exercise of power so that 
State action will be predictable though not necessarily fair or just. Accord-
ingly, it is a purely formal ideal which the legal system of any kind of polity 
is competent to achieve87. Though the Rule of Law can produce a good88, it 
need not do so because the Rule is non-ideological. As Raz asserts : « It is 
not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or 
otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the 
dignity of man [sic]89 ». 
Raz argues that the Rule of Law involves two principles : the making 
of specific laws must be « guided by open and relatively stable general 
rules90 » and the law must be « capable of guiding the behaviour of its 
subjects91 ». On this reading, the Rule of Law is simply not limited to liberal 
democratic constructs (although it is clear that liberal democratic con-
structs would require the Rule of Law). Raz goes so far as to claim that the 
Rule of Law can be consistent with many forms of arbitrary rule : « A ruler 
can promote general rules based on whim or self-interest, etc., without 
83. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65. 
84. M.J. RADIN, loc. cit., note 67. 
85. See A. HUTCHINSON, op. cit., note 82, tx. See also M J . RADIN, loc. cit., note 67, 781 ; 
J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 212, and a comparable definition offered by F.A. HAYEK, The 
Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, p. 54. Like Radin, I shall 
define the Rule of Law as « the rule of law, not individuals », bearing in mind as she does 
that the original formulation proved accurate until quite recently because, until quite 
recently, only men had any part in political life. 
86. See M.J. R A D I N ' S discussion, loc. cit., note 67, 784-787, and J. R A Z , loc. cit., note 81, 
210-289. See too S. MACEDO, Liberal Virtues : Citizenship, Virtue and Community in 
Liberal Constitutionalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 10. 
87. J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 211. 
88. E.P. THOMPSON, op. cit., note 80, p. 265, notes that the reconciliation of conflicts 
through the Rule of Law — and the elaboration of rules and procedures [...] seems to me 
a cultural achievement of universal significance ». Elsewhere (p. 267), Thompson refers 
to the Rule of Law as «an unqualified human good ». 
89. J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 211. 
90. Id.,213. 
91. /rf.,214. 
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offending against the rule of lawy2. » Radin sees things the same way when 
she states that the « instrumental conception is a model of government by 
rules to achieve the government's ends, whatever they may be93 ». A legal 
system will be consistent with the Rule of Law if it produces laws which are 
knowable and capable of being followed94. What interests or values the 
law promotes is an extraneous matter. Of course, instrumentalists would 
acknowledge that the Rule of Law operates within a political context and 
that the law which qualifies as such under the Rule of Law would in turn 
promote specific values ; they simply deny that the Rule of Law itself 
carries any stringent ideological baggage. 
Further, formalists regard the Rule of Law as competent to contain 
value under certain circumstances. It can found social relationships which 
otherwise would be « erratic » by rendering « law itself a stable and safe 
basis for individual planning »95. This stability, in turn, produces a form of 
freedom which, while not political, is the result of a relatively predictable 
environment96. The Rule of Law also contemplates a kind of human dignity 
because its non-violation prevents « frustration » and « disappointed 
expectations »97. On this model, the Rule of Law constitutes a nega-
tive virtue in that « conformity to it does not cause good except through 
avoiding evil and the evil which is avoided is evil which only could have 
been caused by the law itself98». 
And so, while the Rule of Law is indifferent as to the object of a given 
law, it does promote essential features of any properly working legal 
system, namely efficiency99, the provision of effective guidance100 re-
garding the outcome of any given course of conduct and legally enforceable 
remedies101. 
One could charge the instrumentalist Rule of Law model with being 
unacceptably reductionist because, in liberal democracies at least, one 
does not simply seek to ensure efficiency, certainty, and the avoidance of 
disappointment and then assume all political work to have been accom-
92. Id., 219. It must be emphasized that while such rules may be in themselves whimsical, 
they could not be applied whimsically or be subject to retroactive change and still be 
consistent with the Rule of Law. 
93. M.J. R A D I N , he. cit., note 67, 792. 
94. Id., 786. 
95. J. R A Z , loc. cit., note 81, 220. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Id., 222. 
98. Id., 224. 
99. Id., 226. 
100. Id., 218. 
101. Ibid. 
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plished. There are additional, more pressing values requiring respect and 
these are often regarded as being contained in the Rule of Law. 
Those who advocate this latter, substantive account assert that the 
Rule of Law is consistent only with a free society102 and accordingly, the 
State does not meet the Rule of Law standard simply by exercising power 
in a procedurally or formally correct fashion. In addition, the exercise of 
power must be legitimate103, that is, legally exercised and capable of 
substantive justification because the Rule of Law involves « positive con-
tent capable of being expressed in terms of fundamental values104». One 
common version of the substantive model is found in Hayek's contention 
that the Rule of Law should not be confined to mere legality because it : 
presupposes complete legality, but this [legality] is not enough : if a law gave the 
government unlimited power to act as it pleased, all its actions would be legal, but 
it would certainly not be under the rule of law. The rule of law, therefore, is also 
more than constitutionalism : it requires that all law conform to certain prin-
ciples105. 
And these principles are specifically liberal democratic ones. As 
earlier discussed, the liberal model of the individual tends to be that of the 
rational self-maximizer. Because each individual needs a « guaranteed 
sphere of liberty » classical liberals argue that « only a State conceived as a 
civil association, providing a general framework of over-arching rules (a 
rule of law), and restrained in its conduct could guarantee such condi-
tions106 » can afford self-maximization of the individual. Accordingly, the 
Rule of Law is regarded as integral to promoting the negative liberty of 
classical liberalism advocated by John Rawls107 (in that predictability and 
102. See N. MARSH'S discussion, loc. cit., note 75, 243, and that of A. D ' E N T R È V E S , op. cit., 
note 7, pp. 145-146. 
103. A. D 'ENTRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, p. 141. 
104. J.A. JOLOWICZ, «Digest of the Discussion — Chicago Colloquium on «The Rule of Law 
as Understood in the West » », (1959) Annales de la Faculté de droit d'Istamboul, ix, as 
cited by A. D 'ENTRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, p. 145. 
105. F.A. HAYEK, op. cit., note 85, p. 205. See J. RAZ 'S rebuttal, loc. cit., note 81, 228, where 
he points out that what Hayek condemns as « arbitrary exercises of power » are, in fact, 
« perfectly principled particular orders ». It is worth noting too that Hayek misconstrues 
the Rule of Law on another basis. This is because a law which gave unlimited power to 
the government to do whatever it pleased would not, obviously enough, promote the 
certainty, efficiency and realized expectations which are integral to a properly func-
tioning Rule of Law and so would be contrary to it on an instrumental reading alone. 
106. A. VINCENT, op. cit., note 11, p. 118. 
107. See M.J. RADIN 'S discussion of Rawlsian liberty, loc. cit., note 67, 788-790. She quite 
rightly asserts that while Rawls has an instrumentalist conception of the Rule of Law, he 
offers a substantive justification for it (p. 790) : « the Rule of Law is grounded not on the 
bare claim of efficacy of behavioral control, but on the specific political vision of 
traditional liberalism. Liberty is the core value; overreaching by Leviathan is the danger 
on one hand, and disintegration of social cooperation [...] is the danger on the other. » 
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certainty and justice are required if people are to exercise the rational 
choice required for the good life)108. It is also seen as integral to promoting 
the positive liberty of reform liberalism encapsulated in the following 
quotation : 
The function of the legislature in a free society under the Rule of Law is to create 
and maintain the conditions which will uphold the dignity of [the person] as an 
individual. This dignity requires not only the recognition of his [or her] civil and 
political rights but also the establishment of social, economic, educational and 
cultural conditions which are essential to the full development of his [or her] 
personality109. 
Not surprisingly, advocates of the substantive model evaluate State 
conduct on normative grounds. Hayek, for example, argues that State 
interference with the economy is contrary to the Rule of Law110 not be-
cause of any procedurally incorrect aspect in gaining the legislative author-
ity to so act but because anything less than a free market economy is 
contrary to Hayek's vision of classical liberalism. Similarly, it is this model 
of the Rule of Law which permits Dicey to offer very specific conclusions 
regarding the permissibility of State provided goods and services111 (they 
are not permissible) and the acceptability of specialized tribunals to deal 
with administrative matters (they are not acceptable)"2 as judged against 
the liberal principles he finds embedded in the Rule of Law. In sum, the 
substantive model regards the power of the State to be limited by both law 
and a « value » which is «inherent in the State and expressed in the law113 ». 
It should be clear by this point that the two models summarized above 
are not opposite but additive. Put another way, the substantive model 
contains the instrumental one while grafting on—and this is the difference 
between them — an absolute obligation on the State to obey liberal demo-
cratic constraints (however conceived) when exercising power. Does the 
strong relationship between these two models mean, in turn, that we should 
also dismiss the distinction between them ? For the purposes of this proj-
ect, does it really matter whether one views the Canadian State as being 
constrained by one thing — the Rule of Law construed as inherently lib-
eral— or by two things — an instrumental Rule of Law and its specific 
ideological content generated by liberal democratic constructs ? 
108. See M.J. RADIN'S discussion, loc. cit., note 67, 788. 
109. Clause I of the report of Committee I of the International Congress of Jurists at New 
Delhi, 1959, quoted with derision in J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 210, who describes it as a 
« perversion of the doctrine of the rule of law ». 
110. See F.A. HAYEK'S discussion, op. cit., note 85, pp. 227-228. 
111. D. COHEN, « Thinking about the State : Law Reform and the Crown in Canada », (1987) 
24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 379, 389. 
112. A.V. DICEY, op. cit., note 47, p. 193. 
113. A. D'ENTRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, p. 3. 
S. O'BYRNE Theory of the Canadian State 1079 
Theorists like Raz persuasively argue that the distinction between the 
models should be maintained if only because the substantive model leads to 
false conclusions. The central difficulty with the substantive description of 
the Rule of Law is that it mistakenly casts negative values as positive ones. 
For instance, the Rule of Law is often juxtaposed with the exercise of 
arbitrary power114 when in fact it is more accurate to say that the Rule of 
Law, because it produces certainty with respect to how power will be 
exercised, helps to curb arbitrariness115. Similarly, the Rule of Law is said 
to protect individual freedom but again, this protection is simply the likely 
consequence of a legal system which produces predictability of result116. 
As yet another example, one can look to the claim that observance of the 
Rule of Law is intended to ensure respect for each person's human dig-
nity1 17. Raz points out that observance of the Rule of Law produces no such 
axiomatic conclusion though it is clear that « deliberate violation of the rule 
of law violates human dignity118 ». In short, the Rule of Law enshrines 
negative values and so does not guarantee any political or social out-
come ; its non-observance, however—and this is where the two mod-
els coalesce — leads to a State which is antinomic to liberal democratic 
constructs. 
By restricting what conclusions can be drawn from essentially nega-
tive virtues, a divorce of the Rule of Law from precise ideological pronoun-
cements enables one to identify the extraneous basis for the claims made by 
Hayek and Dicey referred to above. The instrumental model thus con-
tributes significantly to the discussion regarding the Canadian State by 
highlighting the relationship while denying any exclusive coextension be-
tween liberal democratic values on the one hand and the ostensible cer-
tainty, efficiency, and predictability of a legal system operating in accord-
ance with the Rule of Law on the other. 
Nonetheless, the instrumental model provides an overly simple ac-
count of Rule of Law component in the Canadian State idea because it fails 
114. See, for example, M.J. RADIN'S discussion of this traditional approach, loc. cit., note 67, 
781 ; J. BLUM'S, loc. cit., note 65, 94, as well as K. HENLEY'S comment: «Protestant 
hermeneutics and the Rule of Law : Gadamer and Dworkin », (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 14-28, 
26: «The rule of law is concerned with protecting people from arbitrary power. » 
115. J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 219; J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 94. 
116. J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 220-221. 
117. See, for example, the definition of the Rule of Law given by the International Congress 
of Jurists quoted earlier in this paper at p. 1078. 
118. J. RAZ, loc. cit., note 81, 221-222. 
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to acknowledge its own unarticulated predicates119. Even at this skeletal 
level, the model can assume, among other matters that first, there is a 
formal or foundational connection between a rule and its application120; 
second, that there is an analytic connection between a word and its mean-
ing121 ; and third, that rules exist prior to and apart from human conduct122. 
All this is to manifest a positivistic naivete. 
Radin proposes a way of remedying these problems through reliance 
on a Wittgensteinian conception of rules. This is to retrieve their possibility 
by regarding rules both as a « social and practice conception. It is a social 
conception because in this view rules depend essentially on social context, 
and it is a practice conception because rules also depend essentially on 
reiterated human activity123 ». On this reading therefore, and setting aside 
the question of whether Wittgenstein's writings do support Radin's model 
or not124, the Rule of Law is reconstructed as a social practice125 which 
acknowledges that «every time we apply a rule we also make it126 ». It 
requires an antiformalist construct : each and every rule is contingent127 ; 
each and every rule is socially constructed128. 
119. Radin shows that the substantive and procedural Rule of Law models are both guilty of 
relying on extreme formalism. See M.J. R A D I N , loc. cit., note 67, 792-797. Because I 
propose to rely on the procedural model for the purposes of my own work, I do not 
propose to return to an analysis of the substantive model in this paper. 
120. Id., 793. 
121. Id., 794. 
122. Id., 795. 
123. Id., 797. 
124. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether Radin's perspective is based on a 
proper reading of Wittgenstein's writings or not as there is considerable debate con-
cerning the impact of Wittgensteinian philosophy on legal theory. On the one hand, 
Wittgenstein is relied upon by certain members of the C.L.S. movement as supporting a 
radical scepticism regarding the possibility of law. See, for example, M. T U S H N E T , 
«Legal Scholarship, Its Causes and Cure », (1981)90 Yale L.J. 1205 and « Following the 
Rules Laid Down : A Critique of the Interpretivism and Neutral Principles », (1982) 96 
Harv. L.Rev. 781 and other leading articles cited by B. LANGILLE, « Revolution without 
Foundation : The Grammar of Scepticism and Law », (1988) 33 McGillL.J. 451. See too 
the numerous articles referenced by G.A. S M I T H , «Wittgenstein and the Sceptical 
Fallacy », (1990) 3 C.J.L.P. 155. On the other hand, Wittgenstein is regarded as having 
been appropriated by advocates of «legal conservatism». See A. HUTCHINSON, 
« That 's Just the Way It is : Langille on Law », (1989) 34 McGillL.J. 145 and R. COOMBE, 
« « Same as It Ever Was » : Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation », (1989) 34 
McGillLJ. 603. See too B. LANGILLE'S response: «Political World »,(1990) 3 C.J.L.P. 
139 and the numerous articles he cites which rely upon Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
125. M.J. R A D I N , loc. cit., note 67, 797. 
126. Id., 807. 
127. Ibid. 
128. Id., 810. 
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Does this modified instrumentalist approach carry with it the con-
clusion that a Rule of Law cannot really exist at all ? If rules are contingent, 
if rules are made even while they are being applied, if rules cannot be fully 
separated from the particular circumstances which seem to invoke them, 
does this not deny the possibility of the legal certainty and the predictability 
of outcome required by the instrumental version of Rule of Law ? 
My position, and that of others including Radin, is that the Rule of Law 
survives notwithstanding. As Radin points out, a Wittgensteinian con-
struction does not insist upon extreme rule scepticism because rules rest on 
« agreement in a form of life129 ». We know, for example, that rules exist 
when «disputes don't break out130». But a Wittgensteinian construction 
does reject traditional formalism, and so regards judges less as functiona-
ries131 and more as 
an interpretive community conscious of their obligation to act as independent 
moral choosers for the good of a society, in light of what that society is and can 
become. The law [...] is neither «found» nor «made», but continuously re-
interpreted. There are still rules. But there are no rules that can be understood 
apart from their context ; nor are there rules that can be understood as fixed in time 
[footnotes deleted]132. 
Modified instrumentalism requires that one emphasize « practice as 
well as words133 », that one regard even the application of « procedural » 
rules as a « pragmatic normative practice '34 » — a delimited social practice, 
not the embodiment of purely objective, purely formalized orderings. (This 
is to correct for the illusory quality of the Rule of Law when « overstated in 
129. Id., 803. 
130. Id., 800 (Radin quoting Wittgenstein). 
131. Id., 811-812. It should be noted that Radin, and not particularly well, criticizes Michael 
Moore for his attempt to combine a traditional Rule of Law with an abandonment of 
traditional formalism. She is particularly concerned that he continues to see the judge as 
a functionary, as being under a «constraint» which demands, in Moore's view, that 
«judges give up some of the decisional freedom we each have as persons when deciding 
what, all things considered, it is best to do ». Radin (p. 811) wants to know how Moore's 
judge can ever be « a responsible moral chooser (a person) » if so constrained yet one 
then must ask Radin what she means by « responsible » (is not a « responsible » person 
likewise «constrained » ?) or what she means when she argues (p. 819) that the Rule of 
Law involves seeing the law as a « pragmatic normative practice » (is not a « normative 
practice » also a « constrained » activity ?). While Moore's position has its difficulties 
— he argues in favour of a kind of natural law theory — Radin has not clearly dis-
tinguished her own position regarding the practice of judging from his. 
132. Id., 817. Radin's use of the word « independent » here is unfortunate only because it is 
unclear—it seems to suggest that judges are not subject to any formalized orderings, 
however conceived. I believe, however, that the word is intended to convey her position 
that judges are to conduct themselves as people, not as positivistic automatons. 
133. Id., 813. 
134. Id., 819. 
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ways that are invited by extreme or simplistic versions of legal formal-
ism135 ».) And finally, it means that, notwithstanding the express accom-
modation of all this necessary contingency, one preserve the Rule of Law 
«as a central normative commitment of our legal system136». 
It needs to be pointed out that Radin's Wittgensteinian perspective on 
rules also contains its share of obvious assumptions, including the pos-
sibility of knowing and applying socially constructed rules. It has the 
advantage, however, of disengaging itself from formalistic naivety while 
preserving the idea that the social practice of justice is competent to 
generate fairness of result and is a worthwhile human endeavour. On this 
model, then, even a procedural interpretation of the Rule of Law is subject 
to substantive scrutiny resulting from an acknowledgement of and adjust-
ment (inspired by a rejection of extreme positivism) to the background 
values upon which it is based137. One thus achieves a more realistic concep-
tion of law by focusing on what is necessarily involved in understanding 
and applying it. Accordingly, modified instrumentalism does not create 
additional uncertainty or contingency in the idea of the Canadian State — it 
only seeks not to deny that which is already inescapably present. As 
Herzog asserts : 
nothing of political note [...] follows from accepting the claim that forms of life are 
socially constructed and not mandated by any kind of natural or transcendant 
necessity. It does not follow, for instance, that radical change may be achieved 
simply by persuading people of the social-construction thesis. Nor does it follow 
that everything must always be up for grabs'38. 
Blum makes the same kind of point when he defends the Rule of Law from 
charges of pernicity by members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement 
who argue that it cannot meet the standards of legal formalism. Blum 
replies : « the failure to satisfy extreme formalist criteria of objectivity and 
separation from politics do [sic] not negate the existence of doctrinal 
regularities differentiating law from purely ad hoc politics139». 
135. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 7. 
136. M.J. RADIN, loc. cit., note 67, 814. 
137. For example, the traditional Rule of Law requirement that one must have notice of a rule 
before one can be regarded as culpable for disregarding it would require reconstruction 
in light of social practice. For example M.J. RADIN, loc. cit., note 67, 815, footnote 120, 
implicitly endorses the position that a car manufacturer would not be entitled to success-
fully argue that « it was justified in behaving negligently in light of the old (and decaying) 
doctrine limiting recovery to those in privity of contract with the manufacturer [foot-
notes deleted] ». 
138. D. HERZOG, «AS Many as Six Impossible Things before Breakfast », (1987) 75 Calif. 
L. Rev. 609, 622. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65,72-73, agrees with Herzog and M.J. RADIN, 
loc. cit., note 67, 803, makes a very similar observation. 
139. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 71. 
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms140 (the «Charter») 
asserts that Canada is founded upon the Rule of Law, the instrumentalist 
quality of which has been formally recognized in a 1985 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada141. This also implies that the Canadian State 
ought to be partially limited by the bindingness which adheres to the State's 
autolimiting act of placing itself under the Rule of Law142. This, in turn, 
produces a mandatory context for the individual-State relationship which 
is not utterly contingent or hopelessly vulnerable. It is a fixture of the 
Canadian State idea that rules or « doctrinal regularities » shouId determine 
outcome — not the army, not pure politics, not unfettered bureaucratic 
will, not simple expedience, and not—contrary to Dyson's assessment — 
a reflexive deference to compromise and civility143. 
The Rule of Law which I have articulated carries with it a conception 
of rules whereby the result of the interaction between State and individual 
seeks to be formal in the sense of being as certain as is humanly possible. 
The Rule of Law on this model, like the idea of the State formulated by 
Dyson, seeks to « systematize the relationship between individual and 
State144 », by striving to make it predictable. Like the idea of the State, the 
Rule of Law emphasises the « autonomous exercise of public authority 
under law rather than participation or citizen competence145 », and «car-
ries few implications about the form of polity146 », yet is located within an 
ideological context147. And it simultaneously obligates the State to seek 
relatively formalized orderings between it and the individual. Identifying 
the Rule of Law as being in part constitutive of the Canadian State leads to a 
clearer understanding of that concept by revealing the relative formal 
stability staked out by the Rule of Law, on the one hand, and the dynamism 
produced in the State idea by the realities of social and political practice as 
140. Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, preamble. 
141. In Re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act, 1870, (1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 23, 
refers to Raz's model with approval and, at 24 reaffirms the following quotation from its 
decision in Patriation Reference : « The « rule of law » is a highly textured expression 
[...] conveying, for example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules 
and of executive accountability to legal authority. » 
142. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 15, asserts that « the idea of the state as a juristic person 
[implies] the subordination of the state to the law which it [creates.] In this process of 
auto-limitation, the state [retains] its inherent power of will ; in submitting to the rule of 
law it limited itself. » 
143. Id., p. 201. 
144. Id., p. 40. 
145. Id., p. 270. 
146. Ibid. 
147. Id., pp. 252-255, wherein Dyson discusses the relationship between ideology and the 
State concept. 
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well as by the influence of liberal political values, on the other. It is to this 
latter influence that I propose to turn now. 
3. Liberal Political Theory 
Liberal political theory, obviously enough, is not all one theory or 
idea. It is a multifaceted, contested concept which generates debate on 
matters as basic as whether the traditional liberal model of the rational, 
self-maximizing, possessive individual is an impoverished148 or a solidly 
realistic account of human nature. To this extent, liberal theory does the 
very thing it seeks to describe149 by manifesting a tolerance for diversity 
and in tacitly assuming that the best account will carry the day150. This also 
means, however, that the conceptual dynamic inherent in liberal theory 
poses problems both of simple description and substantive resolution. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify relatively stable, core liberal 
values151 while acknowledging the impossibility of incontestability. And 
though the project of identification is thereby necessarily limited and 
consciously constricted for the purposes of this paper, it produces enough 
to assist in directing debate regarding important aspects of the Canadian 
State. 
Liberalism is first and foremost about regard for the human person152, 
about an overarching respect for individual rights and freedoms. It stands 
for « peace through toleration, law-bound liberty and a rights-orientated 
conception of justice153 ». Respect for individual autonomy means that, for 
the most part, the individual occupies a qualified position of primacy over 
the collective154; this in turn includes «the right to define, revise, and 
pursue a vision of the good life155 ». Liberalism is egalitarian, holding that 
148. See C.B. MACPHERSON, The Real World of Democracy, Toronto, The Hunter Rose 
Company, 1965, pp. 54-55. He holds the position that the model is profoundly impo-
verished ; authors referred to by Dyson and Gray in footnote 46 take the opposite 
position. 
149. S. M A C E D O , op. cit., note 86, p . 40, notes that « liberal institutions provide the settings 
for ongoing efforts to formalize, clarify, contest, justify, refine, and extend liberal 
principles ». 
150. J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46, p. x, remarks upon the distinctive meliorist trend charac-
terizing liberalism. 
151. Id., i x : Gray asserts that «whereas liberalism has no single, unchanging nature or 
essence, it has a set of distinctive features which exhibits its modernity». 
152. S. M A C E D O , op. cit., note 86, p. 87. 
153. Id., p. 40. 
154. J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46, p. x. 
155. S. M A C E D O , op. cit., note 86, p. 78. There are, of course, limits to what liberals would 
accept as the legitimate pursuit of good life. See, for example, J. RAWLS, op. cit., note 
79, pp. 60-65, where he presents two overriding principles through which individual 
liberty is constrained. 
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all members of society are of equal moral worth156 and possess the same 
legal and political rights157. It acknowledges threats to individual autonomy 
inherent in the overarching quality of State authority158 and in the potential 
for an intolerant use of power by the political majority159. Accordingly, it 
seek to mitigate social and political relationships because it assumes that 
«individual rights have a substance worth preserving160». It seeks to 
safeguard liberty161 through enforcing an evolving, mutable162 list of free-
doms, including freedom of speech, expression, movement and association 
as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention163. It identifies the 
need for checks and balances on government and political majorities to 
avoid abuses of power164 ; it affirms the principle of governmental account-
ability165 as well as the constructive possibilities of human rationality166. 
Liberals trust in the corrective power and justice producing capacity 
of procedure generally and the Rule of Law specifically167 ; they affirm 
the possibility of and value in principled strategies of «rational gov-
ernance168 ». 
156. J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46, p. x. 
157. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 146. 
158. A. CAIRNS, loc. cit., note 1, 320, asserts that the Canadian state is «not a distant 
Olympian presence, but an omnipresent factor » and his footnote 3, approvingly refers to 
Douglas Hartle's assertion in Public Policy Decision Making and Regulation, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 1979, that the state has a vital role «as the ultimate rule maker and rule 
enforcer that can and does, by changing the rules, affect all of the sources of well-being 
of all individuals directly or indirectly, for good or for ill ». 
159. See R. DWORKIN. « Liberal Community », (1989) 77 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 481-484. 
160. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 71. 
161. J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46. p. 61. 
162. Ibid. As Gray notes, liberal freedoms are not fixed : they « will embody the conditions 
necessary in a given historical circumstance for the growth and exercise of powers of 
autonomous thought and action ». 
163. Ibid. These individual rights and freedoms are constitutionally enshrined in the Charter, 
supra, note 140. 
164. As J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46. p. 74, notes, a liberal political order requires « constraints 
on the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority » and insulates basic liberties from 
« revision by temporary political majorities ». See too J. B L U M , loc. cit., note 65, 77. It is 
clearly at this point that the Rule of Law regard for procedural integrity becomes both an 
informing structure and a value. Good procedure is seen as integral, but not sufficient to 
justice and fairness. 
165. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 77. 
166. Id., 76 : Blum argues that under liberalism, the government has a fundamental obligation 
«to act rationally and to promote the general welfare. » 
167. See S. MACEDO. op. cit., note 86, pp. 10 and 272. 
168. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 77. For a similar account of core liberal values, see 
W. KYMLICKA. Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, 
p. 140. Charles Taylor notes that a different model of liberalism is at work in Quebec. See 
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I will postpone a discussion of the positive values associated with 
liberalism until later in this paper. For now, the foregoing attenuated 
account is offered only as a summary of critical private rights elevated by 
liberal political theory ; it is offered as an illustration of the negative values 
which constitute one of its dominant features. It is because of this negative 
content that liberalism has often been regarded as having no developed 
understanding of the public interest : as being incapable of fostering a 
« consensual community169 » or of providing a public morality170. Accord-
ingly, the liberal societies of Britain and the United States, for example, are 
also seen to embody only a weak notion of the State (when compared to 
their Western continental European counterparts) because, I suggest, 
Anglo-American liberalism is regarded as having stripped away the polit-
ical tools and social resolve to produce a structured notion of the public 
interest. In short, it is believed liberalism is so focused on the private, that it 
cannot properly acknowledge, let alone generate insight into, the public. 
Dyson, for example, offers numerous and distinct reasons for his 
assessment of Anglo-American societies as « stateless » (that is, he recog-
nizes parallels and differences between the British and American traditions 
both of which lead away from a full State understanding), none of which 
directly refers to the impact of liberalism but many of which unmistakably 
assume its influence. Take, for instance, his assertions that England has 
manifested « in particular a disinclination to explore ideas about the dis-
tinctive character of public authority171 » that Anglo-American govern-
ments are not ascribed with any strong « capacity to determine what the 
public interest is1 7 2», that there is no conceptualization of the public 
interest as pre-existing but rather as something which emerges as the 
« compromise product » of bargaining amongst competing groups173. All 
this is to argue subtextually that a primary regard for the individual, 
doubtless a feature of Anglo-American societies, is to foreclose the exist-
ence of a strong community and sense of the public interest and well-being. 
Accordingly, for Dyson, Anglo-American societies — instead of adopting a 
Western continental European notion of the public interest, that is a notion 
which unifies, and is «common to all members of society, a collective self-
interest subject to reinterpretation by which individuals will prefer not to 
C. TAYLOR, «Shared and Divergent Values», in R. WATTS and D. BROWN (eds.), 
Options for a New Canada, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1991, p. 53, and 
discussion in footnote 193, infra. 
169. S. MACEDO, op. cit., note 86, p. 78. 
170. Ibid. 
171. K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 42. 
172. Id., p. 272. 
173. Id., pp. 273-274. 
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pursue their « egoistic » interests in order that others will not inflict damage 
on them by pursuing theirs174» — make do with something considerably 
less rarefied. British societies in particular, notes Dyson, tend to translate 
political morality into the practice of civility which involves mutual respect 
for individuality and, therefore, « tolerance for diversity and individu-
ality175 ». All this implies exhibiting a reliance not on some relatively fixed 
State idea but on the «creative nature, vitality and resilience of a varie-
gated civil society and in civic humanism, rooted in the practice of civility, 
as the source of standards in public life176». 
If Dyson's assessment of the Anglo State is correct, then two things 
follow. First, it means that common law Canada, as a beneficiary of British 
tradition and so a participant in a similar kind of liberalism, has a very 
rudimentary idea of community and thereby partakes in a highly contingent 
existence. Second, it means that the idea of the State is emphatically uni-
directional ; it specifies what the Government cannot do but provides no 
guidance as to what it can or ought to do. Accordingly, the positive content 
in the Canadian idea of the State is thin, mercurial, and elusive. And 
because it is very difficult to theorize about, it therefore can provide only 
limited assistance in defining the nature of the Canadian State. 
Fortunately for this project, however, Dyson's assessment is incor-
rect. Like other critics of liberalism, he falters in his analysis simply 
because he fails to « take liberalism seriously177 » and in this case, he does 
so on three closely related fronts. First, he fails to see how aspects of the 
State idea could legitimately and usefully be founded on specifically nega-
tive values related to protecting individual autonomy and the concomitant 
ethic which casts the provision of this protection as a worthwhile State 
endeavour178. Second, he fails to recognize that even the most «rights » 
orientated version of liberalism has embedded in it a notion of community 
and so of what constitutes pivotal components in the public interest179. 
174. Id., p. 274. 
175. Id., p. 201. 
176. Ibid. 
177. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65,79, uses this phrase. Blum also asserts that (p. 68) «Currently 
in the United States, we are experiencing a kind of political confusion and backlash 
against liberalism. » S. MACEDO, op. cit., note 86, p. 4, notices this trend as well: 
« «liberal » has become a term of abuse in the American political lexicon ». 
178. My point is that even « stateless » societies are organized in terms of important, foun-
dational ideas. 
179. R. DWORKIN, loc. cit., note 159, 480. W. KYMLICKA, op. cit., note 168, p. 1, is of a 
similar view : « Liberalism, as a political philosophy, is often viewed as being primarily 
concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state, and with limiting 
state intrusions on the liberties of citizens. But, implicitly or explicitly, liberalism also 
contains a broader account of the relationship between the individual and society — and, 
in particular, of the individual's membership in a community and a culture. » 
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Third, he implicitly assumes that Anglo-American liberalism is incom-
petent to generate principled «strategies of governance180» because, for 
him, liberalism resolves all conflicts by compromise only — there are few 
fixed ideas which limit how conflict is to be resolved. As I have already 
made note of the ethical and procedural principles concomitant with a 
liberal respect for individual autonomy, I will now explore the notions of 
community and the strategies of governance which are implicit in liberal-
ism. In this way, I hope to uncover further content to the idea of the 
Canadian State, content which is positive and generative. 
We have already said that majority rule is not another word for 
democratic liberalism. Neither is it another word for community. Indeed, 
Dworkin cogently argues that liberalism embraces a notion of community 
as constituted in part by formal political decisions made by officials who 
« act self-consciously under a constitutional structure that transforms their 
individual behaviour into national decisions181 ». This notion of community 
is also grounded in an abiding affirmation of justice and on the notion that 
the individual has an integrative stake in the salubrity of even the most 
thinly construed political community182. Hence, while there may be dis-
agreement amongst community members as to what justice is, there is a 
shared understanding 
that politics is a joint venture in a particularly strong sense : that 
everyone, of every conviction and economic level, has a personal 
stake-a strong personal stake for someone with a lively sense of 
his [or her] critical interests — injustice not only for [that indivi-
dual] but for everyone else as well. That understanding provides a 
powerful bond underlying even the most heated argument over 
particular policies and principles183. 
For Dworkin, an unjust community impedes the critical interests of the 
individual in pursuing his or her life project ; accordingly, each of us 
« shares that powerful reason for wanting our community to be a just 
one184 ». Further, the liberal public ideal to favour policies which respect 
the equality of each citizen185 is not realized in a community which dis-
regards justice. Thus, concludes Dworkin, «our success or failure in 
180. I have borrowed this phrase from J. B L U M , he. cit., note 65, 120. 
181. R. D W O R K I N , he. cit., note 159, 496. 
182. Id., 499. 
183. Id., 501-502. 
184. Id., 504. 
185. Id., 503. 
S. O'BYRNE Theory of the Canadian State 1089 
leading the lives people like us should have, are in that limited but powerful 
way parasitic on our success together in politics. Political community has 
that ethical primacy over our individual lives186. » 
This foundational integration between justice and liberalism has been 
asserted by other modern theorists as well, including d'Entrèves187, John 
Rawls188, and Macedo189. It is a core liberal political value which has strong 
public repercussions including the provision of social stability and the 
aspiration that conflict can be peacefully resolved on the basis of principled 
rationality. It also provides specific content to the idea of the Canadian 
State in that it requires a normative concern with determining the proper 
conditions for the exercise of State power and how individuals are entitled 
to interact. For the specific matter of what Government can and cannot do, 
of what would be just Governmental conduct, the idea of the Canadian 
State means that it is held to standards of behaviour which, while never 
capable of a definitive articulation, can be identified. Blum convincingly 
argues, for example, that liberal values limit the range of options open 
to the State190—he thereby places the matter of Governmental conduct 
squarely in the normative realm. And so, among other matters, Govern-
ment is bound by the Rule of Law ; Government is bound by its democratic 
mandate to serve the electorate ; and, more expansively, Government is 
bound by an ethic which enforces respect for individual autonomy. Put 
another way, ideas imbedded in the notion of justice and negative liberal 
values are the ideas which constrain Government and foster a consensual 
community. And all this can and does occur in the midst of liberal demo-
cratic pluralism because « liberal justice overarches the diversity of liberal 
society informing its constitution and [provides] a public morality191 ». 
The notion of justice, of bounded choices emanating from democratic 
liberalism, does not, of course, create an uncontestable and enumerative 
understanding of the public interest or of the consensual community em-
bodied in democratic liberal societies of the Canadian State itself. This is 
186. Id., 504. 
187. A. D'ENTRÈVES, op. cit., note 7, pp. 3-4, notes that one account of why laws are 
obligatory is because « laws are the expression of a value called «justice » ». 
188. J. RAWLS, op. cit., note 79. 
189. S. MACEDO, op. cit., note 86. Macedo uses a slightly different vocabulary to discuss 
justice, devoting much of his book to what he calls (p. 41) « public justification ». Public 
justification requires that «the application of power [by the State] should be accom-
panied with reasons that all reasonable people should be able to accept». 
190. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 135-138. 
191. S. MACEDO, op. cit., note 86, p. 78. 
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because first, both theory and practice deny such a possibility and 
second, the flexibility mandatorily produced by a liberal ethic of toler-
ance forecloses the possibility of definitive autocratic pronouncements 
regarding it193. But at the same time, the idea of the Canadian State is not 
rudderless. We have seen that it requires both the modification of and 
constraint upon political choices open to Government which are derived 
from respect for negative liberal values. And, in addition, when one as-
cribes to the State, as most liberals do194 a proactive role through which it is 
made responsible for general welfare195 and so is required to have a com-
munity presence and social commitment « going beyond rights-protection 
and the upholding of justice '96 », further content is lent to the Canadian idea 
of the State. Taken together, the State's performative and reactive func-
tions, as well as the auto-limiting act binding it to the Rule of Law, each 
identify and create standards of conduct which the Government must meet 
in its activities. And these standards are not the result of compromise but 
are derived from and necessarily elevated by the State's solemn obligation 
to protect individual rights, promote the common good, provide collective 
goods and social welfare benefits, respect the Rule of Law, and ensure the 
presence of justice in the community. The standards of conduct con-
comitant with such powers and responsibilities are mandatory. Concerning 
at least this, Canada has a public morality, a consensual community, a 
State concept. 
192. Indeed, even the elevated sort of public interest manifest in the Western continental 
European State cannot be clearly identified because, as K. DYSON, op. cit., note 8, p. 8, 
points out, the notion of the State is unavoidably imprecise : «As a philosophical and 
culturally rich concept, state is not amenable to the elaboration of «operational indi-
cators » involved in the sort of rigorous definition desired by advocates of the natural 
science paradigm and system builders. » 
193. Toleration for pluralism has the potential, for example, to resolve the conflict between 
the libera] model present in Quebec as compared to the rest of the country. C. TAYLOR, 
loc. cit., note 168, 72, points out that Quebec's liberalism combines itself with an 
emphasis on collective goals and thus opposes the Kantian, procedural-based view of 
liberalism characteristic of the rest of Canada. These two inconsistent views of liberal-
ism can be reconciled, according to Taylor, through the identification of common 
ground : « Procedural liberals in English Canadajust have to acknowledge first that there 
are other possible models of liberal society, and second that their francophone com-
patriots wish to live by one such alternative. » 
194. Most liberals would agree that more than a minimalist level of government is mandated 
by liberal democratic tenets. According to J. GRAY, op. cit., note 46, p. 73 : « Classical 
liberals such as Humboldt, Spencer and Nozick have argued, it is true, that the functions 
of the state must of necessity be restricted to the protection of rights and the upholding of 
justice, but this position has no clear warrant in liberal principles and is a minority view 
within the liberal tradition. » 
195. J. BLUM, loc. cit., note 65, 76. 
196. Id., 73-74. 
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Conclusion 
My objective in this paper has been to show how liberal democratic 
theory, both in its negative and positive requirements, helps identify a 
Canadian State idea in the sense described by Dyson and discussed in Part I 
of this paper. That is, the idea of the Canadian State — which I have argued 
is partially located by liberal democratic constructs — produces broadly 
shared public values. These values interact with institutional conduct not 
as merely passive reflections nor determinants of action but as dynamic 
constituents197 of the State concept. 
This interaction, in turn, is competent to produce—as in the State 
tradition articulated by Dyson : 
[a] holism [a] normative concern with the nature of public authority and the terms 
on which it is to be exercised, its rationalist preoccupation with the creative role of 
institutions and with giving its constituent ideas institutional expression as a way 
of «fixing» certain meanings within public life198. 
That the State idea can be regarded as incrementally modulating the exer-
cise of public power—and vice versa — itself argues for a State-society 
distinction which is not generally acknowledged or explored in common 
law Canada. 
The discussion in this paper has also been offered as illustration that 
accounting for the Canadian State is an elusive project because the State is 
not contained in its constitutive components — it is necessarily located 
outside of the ideas and conduct which produce it. The State concept is 
found in the fluctuating convergence and tension between theory and 
practice, in its foundational ideas which are both fixed and contingent, 
and in the conduct of public officials and elected representatives which is 
both principled and not, both considered and not. The State concept is 
constantly transcending the words used to describe it. 
But though the State concept transcends its constituents, its effect on 
the lives of individuals and groups is far from metaphysical. Within the 
context of debates generated by philosophical theory, Rosemary Coombe 
asserts : 
We do not have, nor do we need, any transcendental or metaphysical foundation 
to legitimate our convictions that poverty and sexual violence, torture and racial 
197. Of course, the pronouncements of liberal democratic theory have their origins in society 
as well—in debate, conflict, and often enough, compromise. But this origin does not 
necessarily lead back to a disintegrative theory of the State. I take the position, along 
with Dyson, that while the moral and political ideas in the State are partially created and 
modulated by conduct, these moral and political ideas simultaneously exist « apart from 
the conflicts and fluctuations of social and political life ». SeeK. DYSON, op. cz'f., note 8, 
p. 232. 
198. Id., p. 8. 
1092 Les Cahiers de Droit (1992) 33 c. de D. 1057 
discrimination should not be tolerated as part of the social reality orform of life in 
which we live, and the lack of such foundations will not alter our political practices 
in the least199. 
This is deconstructionist commentary which, from the perspective of State 
model offered in this paper, itself becomes an important part of the Cana-
dian State idea. I make this claim with no intention autocratically to 
relocate Rosemary Coombe's analysis. I mean only to underscore the 
essential role of such work in analysing the Canadian State concept. In 
short, a liberal democratic State which does not protect its citizenry from 
profound attacks on human dignity is itself in collision with the ideas which 
ostensibly bind it. In highlighting contradictions between what the State is 
meant to do from the perspective of theory, and what it does institutionally, 
discourse concerning the State can possess unshakeable generative capa-
bilities through its call to remediation or the deepest political reform. 
Hence, notwithstanding the intractable problems posed by State the-
ory, I have, in this paper, spoken about the State in the belief that it will get 
us somewhere. While the State is a problem-creating concept200 it is also a 
problem-solving concept201 — among other matters, it has the potential to 
contextualize the exercise of public power and to suggest limits on what 
officials can do in the name of the polis and how they can do it202 ; it can 
enforce a relationship between « idea and conduct », between «form and 
practice in public life203 ». All this points to a State concept which does not 
merely coincide with the society in which it is found or with the laws which 
constrain it but which exists in its own right. 
199. J. C O O M B E , loc. cit., note 124, 64, her footnote 146 
200. K. D Y S O N , op. cit., note 8, pp. 254 and 270. 
201. Id., p. 270. 
202. Id., p. 275. 
203. Id., p . 6. 
